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Background:  38 
The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted routine measles immunisation and supplementary 39 
immunisation activities (SIAs) in most countries including Kenya. We assessed the risk of measles 40 
outbreaks during the pandemic in Kenya as a case study for the African Region.  41 
 42 
Methods:  43 
Combining measles serological data, local contact patterns, and vaccination coverage into a cohort 44 
model, we predicted the age-adjusted population immunity in Kenya and estimated the probability of 45 
outbreaks when contact-reducing COVID-19 interventions are lifted. We considered various scenarios 46 
for reduced measles vaccination coverage from April 2020.  47 
 48 
Results:  49 
In February 2020, when a scheduled SIA was postponed, population immunity was close to the herd 50 
immunity threshold and the probability of a large outbreak was 34% (8-54). As the COVID-19 contact 51 
restrictions are nearly fully eased, from December 2020, the probability of a large measles outbreak will 52 
increase to 38% (19-54), 46% (30-59), 54% (43-64) assuming a 15%, 50% and 100% reduction in measles 53 
vaccination coverage. By December 2021, this risk increases further to 43% (25-56), 54% (43-63) and 54 
67% (59-72) for the same coverage scenarios respectively. However, the increased risk of a measles 55 
outbreak following the lifting of all restrictions can be overcome by conducting a SIA with ≥ 95% 56 
coverage in under-fives. 57 
  58 
Conclusion:  59 
While contact restrictions sufficient for SAR-CoV-2 control temporarily reduce measles 60 
transmissibility and the risk of an outbreak from a measles immunity gap, this risk rises rapidly once 61 
these restrictions are lifted. Implementing delayed SIAs will be critical for prevention of measles 62 
outbreaks given the roll-back of contact restrictions in Kenya.  63 
 64 




The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has damaged the economy, and disrupted social interaction and important 68 
health services in Kenya and elsewhere.1,2 The cumulative incidence of COVID-19 cases continues to 69 
rise in many parts of Africa suggesting the current mitigation measures will be maintained or 70 
reintroduced for periods at least until the pandemic peaks.3  71 
 72 
Despite the World Health Organization (WHO) advisory to sustain routine immunization (RI), vaccine 73 
coverage temporarily declined in many countries including Kenya that reports a 33% disruption of RI.4-74 
7 Following guidance from the WHO, all countries suspended scheduled measles SIAs.6-8 Measles 75 
control in Kenya is achieved by giving children a first dose of Measles Containing Vaccine (MCV1) at 76 
9 months, and a second dose (MCV2) from 18 months. SIAs, first introduced in 2002 are conducted 77 
periodically among children <5 years or <15 years for accelerated control of measles.9 Based on 78 
accumulation of susceptible children, the timing of such campaigns has typically been chosen to close 79 
immunity gaps in time to prevent potentially large measles outbreaks. A Measles SIA originally planned 80 
for 2019 was rescheduled for February 2020 due to a shortfall in funding and postponed again following 81 
the COVID-19 pandemic. 82 
 83 
Following identification of the first COVID-19 case on March 13, 2020, Kenya imposed various 84 
mitigation measures: ban on large gatherings, suspension of international flights, closure of bars, 85 
cessation of movement from hotspot counties, restriction of restaurant operating hours and a 86 
nationwide curfew from 7pm to 5 am. While it is plausible that these physical distancing and lock 87 
4 
down measures may reduce the risk of measles outbreaks, they are temporary and may be associated 88 
with rebound risk periods.   89 
 90 
The availability of recent measles serological data provided the opportunity to use Kenya as a case study 91 
to estimate the impact of reduced measles vaccination coverage and suspended SIAs due to COVID-19 92 
on the risk of measles outbreaks.   93 
5 
Methods 94 
This study used a cohort mathematical model that combined measles serological data, local contact 95 
patterns, and vaccination coverage estimates. 96 
Serological data 97 
We estimated measles immunity profile in children using serum samples collected during serological 98 
surveys among residents of Kilifi Health and Demographic Surveillance System (KHDSS) Kilifi, Kenya10 99 
for the Pneumococcal Conjugate Vaccine Impact Study (PCVIS)11 These serosurveys, conducted every 100 
two years since 2009, target 50 KHDSS randomly selected children in ten age strata (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 101 
7, 8-9 and 10-14 years) and blood samples <2ml were collected from participants. The sample size for 102 
the PCVIS serosurveys was calculated to obtain narrow confidence intervals around the estimate of 103 
prevalence of immune response both overall and by age-category for each serosurvey year. For 104 
instance, for a proportion of 0.80, the 95% confidence intervals (CIs) would be 0.77- 0.84 overall and 105 
0.69-0.91 in each age stratum.  106 
 107 
In the 2019 serosurvey, there were 497 participants and the blood samples were collected in July (165), 108 
August (162), September (130) and October (40). We tested for measles immunoglobulin G (IgG) 109 
antibodies using a fluorescent-bead-based multiplex immunoassay. Antibody concentrations ≥0.12 110 
IU/ml were considered protective against measles.12 111 
 112 
We assumed these results reflected measles immunity in Kilifi in August 2019, and assumed 96% of 113 
persons >15 years had protective measles antibodies concentrations, similar to findings in adults in 114 
6 
Nairobi in 2007-200913 (Table 1). We also assumed  protection from maternal immunity was similar to 115 
the proportions of the infants <9 months old who had protective antibodies. 116 
Vaccination coverage 117 
MCV1 national coverage in Kenya has been between 75% and 80% since its introduction in 1985.14 118 
MCV2 was introduced in Kenya in 2013 and coverage rose up to 45% in 2018.9 The last measles SIA in 119 
children aged 9 months to 14 years took place in 2016 and achieved 95% coverage.15 120 
We assumed national MCV1 and MCV2 coverage were 79% and 45% respectively in 2018, and that 121 
these stayed at the same level from August 2019 until the end of March 2020 when COVID-19 contact 122 
restrictions were introduced in Kenya. From April 2020, we explored the following routine vaccination 123 
coverage scenarios alongside a suspended SIA 124 
 125 
A. routine vaccination coverage remained the same  126 
B. routine vaccination coverage reduced by 15% for both MCV1 and MCV2  127 
C. routine vaccination coverage reduced by 50% for both MCV1 and MCV2  128 
D. routine vaccination was suspended 129 
Contact matrix 130 
We used an age-mixing matrix which consisted of the number of contacts between six different age 131 
groups. The matrix was generated from diary studies conducted in Kilifi, Kenya16 using a bootstrap of 132 
4000 samples by randomly sampling n individuals with replacement from the n participants of the 133 
contact survey. 134 
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Projecting immunity 135 
We adapted a static cohort model of measles immunity17 to estimate age-stratified population immunity 136 
profile in Kilifi by combining recent measles serological data with new vaccine-derived immunity 137 
during the prediction period using the local vaccination schedule, MCV1 and MCV2 uptake, and 138 
vaccine efficacy. We assumed waning immunity or additional acquired immunity from natural 139 
exposure, and demographic changes in the short time frame were negligible. Hence, the key 140 
mechanisms of the projection model were that individuals are born at a constant rate, gained immunity 141 
through vaccination at the recommended age and at the observed coverage, and grow older. 142 
 143 
In extrapolating immunity for young infants under 9 months old, maternal immunity was assumed to 144 
be the same as the observed data. For ages 9 months to 17 months, immunity was estimated in 145 
accordance with the assumed MCV1 vaccination uptake and a vaccine effectiveness of 93%. For those 146 
18 months, we estimated the immunity based on the assumed uptake of MCV2 and the same vaccine 147 
effectiveness. We aggregated projected immunity to age groups given by contact data and weighted 148 
each age group according to population estimates before averaging them to estimate overall immunity. 149 
We did not explicitly model MCV2 delivery but rather assumed that the MCV1 effectiveness is an 150 
average of MCV1 and MCV2 efficacy weighted by proportion of children who receive MCV1 only or 151 
both doses. The underlying assumption here was that the same children who received MCV2 had also 152 
received MCV1. We predicted age-stratified and population level immunity until December 2021. 153 
 154 
To derive a contact-adjusted estimate for the proportion of the population who are immune to measles, 155 
the predicted age-stratified immunity profile was weighted by age-stratified social contact patterns 156 
8 
observed in Kilifi. This method has been previously shown to yield robust projections for measles 157 
immunity to transmission in the population.17 158 
 159 
The herd immunity threshold (HIT) for measles during the COVID-19 pandemic was calculated 160 
assuming an R0 of 12 to 18 with a median of 1418 and that COVID-19 prescribed contact restrictions 161 
caused a 50% reduction in measles transmissibility similar to the observed reduction in physical 162 
contacts in Kenya.19 We also explored a 25% and 75% reduction in measles transmissibility in a 163 
sensitivity analysis. The HIT is calculated as 𝓗0 = (R0-1)/R0. 164 
Quantitative impact of outbreak risk 165 
We obtained a crude estimate of the outbreak risk using the predicted immunity and HIT. The 166 
probability of a large outbreak, p, sparked by a single infected individual was given by p = 1-(1/R)I0 167 
where I0 is the initial number infected and R is the effective reproductive number. R<1 implies that 168 
probability, p, is negative which is defined to be 0 for no outbreak.  169 
The effectiveness of a post-lockdown SIA in reducing outbreak risk 170 
We assessed the impact of SIAs in two age categories; 9 months to 5 years and 9 months to 15 years, by 171 
predicting the post-SIA immunity profile and the corresponding risk for a large measles outbreak. We 172 
simulated SIAs in either November 2020, December 2020 or December 2021, assumed a coverage of 173 
95% similar to the most recent national SIA in 2016,15 and applied vaccine efficacy of MCV1. The SIA 174 
was simulated by reducing the age specific pool of susceptible by the effective coverage of the SIA. 175 
 176 
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 In simulating the SIA, we used the age-specific predicted immunity to calculate the age specific pool 177 
of susceptible at the different time-points. We reduced this age specific pool of susceptible in the age-178 
groups of interest by the effective coverage of the SIA. We aggregated the results and adjusted the 179 
overall crude immunity using the social contact matrix. Finally, we calculated the outbreak probability 180 
assuming a SIA is conducted before restrictions are lifted (using the reduced HIT based on 50% 181 
reduction in contacts) and assuming an SIA is conducted after restrictions are lifted (using the normal 182 
HIT based on 0% reduction in contacts)  183 
 184 
Uncertainty analyses 185 
We assessed the sensitivity of our findings to uncertainty inherent in several of our assumptions via 186 
probabilistic re-sampling. We included uncertainty for population immunity profile, combined MCV1 187 
and MCV2 vaccine effectiveness, and MCV1 and MCV2 coverage (Table 1). As part of each parameter 188 
bootstrap, we also bootstrapped participants of the serological survey and hence the age stratified 189 
population immunity at the start of the simulation. We present median estimates including uncertainty 190 
quantified as per the 95% quantiles of the 4000 bootstrap samples.. 191 
Sensitivity analyses 192 
We conducted a sensitivity analysis to assess the impact of a delay in receipt of MCV1 on outbreak 193 
probability. We delayed the age of receipt of MCV1 in our model by three months as reported for 194 
delayed vaccination in Kilifi 20 and also by six months. We also predicted unadjusted population 195 








Table 1: Model parameters. An overview of the key model parameter assumptions and their sources. 203 
Parameter ranges are those used in the sensitivity analyses 204 
 205 
Parameter Value (95% quantiles) Source 
Vaccine schedule 
 
MCV1: 9 months 




MCV1: 85% (80 - 90%) 
+MCV2: 98% (95 - 100%) 
 




Age-Immunity profile in <15y old 
(Bootstrapped from data) 
Observed in 2019 11 
Proportion immune among >15y old 
(Beta distributed) 
96% (90 - 99%) 13 
Vaccine coverage Aug 2019 to March 2020 
(assumed to be same as in 2018) 
(Beta distributed) 
MCV1: 79% (75-85%) 
MCV2: 45% (40-50%) 
9,14,20 
Vaccine coverage from April 2020 MCV1 & MCV2 0%, 15%, 50% 




14 (12 - 18) 18 
Reduction in contacts during COVID-19 
 
50% (25% and 75%) 24 
Age demographics from KHDSS in 2019 10 
Social mixing matrix from 2011/12 16 
 206 
  207 
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Results 208 
Measles seroprevalence in Kilifi in late 2019 209 
The proportion of MCV1-eligible children with protective measles antibody concentrations was high 210 
in 2019 as shown in figure 1 and additional file 1; Table S1. 71 of 74 (96%) children >=9 years had 211 
protective levels. Similarly, 228 of 237 (96%) 4-8-year-olds were immune. Among under-fours eligible 212 
for MCV1, 145 of 166 (87%) were immune while one of 20 (0.05%) children under 9 months old, who 213 
were ineligible for MCV1, had protective antibodies.  214 
Age adjusted immunity 215 
We estimate that in late 2019, population immunity adjusted for age-differences in social contacts was 216 
90% (85-92). Predicted immune proportions was unchanged in February 2020, at the time of originally 217 
planned SIA. 218 
Following the start of COVID-19 pandemic and restriction measures that caused a decrease in 219 
vaccination coverage, we estimate that population immunity decreased quickly, depending on extent 220 
of reduction in vaccination coverage. If coverage reduced by 15% from April 2020, the contact-adjusted 221 
population immunity would decline to 88% (85-91) by December 2020 and 87% (84-90) by December 222 
2021. A 50% reduction in vaccination coverage would lead to a more rapid decline in this immunity to 223 
87% (83-89)  in December 2020 and 85% (81-87) in December 2021(Figure 2) 224 
Age adjusted immunity vs herd immunity threshold 225 
A basic reproduction number of 14 (12-18) implies a HIT of 93% (82-94) and if, as a result of physical 226 
distancing, measles transmission is reduced by 25%, 50% and 75% this HIT drops to 90% (89-93), 86% 227 
(83-89) and 71% (67-78) as seen in additional file 2: Fig.S1. Before contact restrictions came into effect 228 
in April 2020, age-adjusted immunity was below the HIT: in 99% of simulations this immunity was 229 
below the HIT (Additional file 3: Fig. S1). Reduction in HIT temporarily mitigated the immediate risk 230 
for measles outbreak as in April 2020, 94% of simulations were above the 50% reduced transmission 231 
HIT, 20% were above the 25% reduced HIT and 100% of simulations were above the 75% reduced 232 
HIT. 233 
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Depending on vaccination coverage maintained during COVID-19 pandemic, population immunity 234 
may decline quickly in young children (<2 years). By April 2020, age-adjusted immunity fell below the 235 
normal transmission HIT in all simulations under all the scenarios. (Additional file 3: Fig. S1). 236 
Similarly, the risk of a large measles outbreak from introduction of a single infectious individual 237 
increased quickly if routine vaccination coverage declined (Figure 3). If in December 2020, measles 238 
transmissibility is similar to pre-COVID-19 levels and routine measles coverage since April 2020 239 
reduced by 15%, 50% or 100%, we estimate probability for a large measles outbreak as 38% (19-54), 240 
46% (30-59), 54% (43-64) respectively in the age-adjusted analysis. By December 2021, this risk would 241 
increase to 43% (25-56), 54% (43-63) and 66% (59-72) respectively. The probability of a large measles 242 
outbreak was much lower if measles transmissibility reduced by 25%, 50% and 75% (Additional file 4: 243 
Fig. S1). In December 2020, if routine measles coverage since April 2020 reduced by 50%, we estimate 244 
probability of a large measles outbreak as 28% (7-45), 0% (0-18) and 0%(0-0) assuming a 25%, 50% and 245 
75% reduction in transmission. 246 
Effectiveness of a SIA 247 
A SIA in 9-month to 5-year-old children or 9-months to 15-year-olds both during and immediately 248 
after lifting transmission-reducing COVID-19 restrictions can substantially reduce outbreak risk 249 
(Figure 4).  250 
 251 
If measles vaccine coverage declines by 15%, 50% or 100% from April 2020, a post lockdown SIA 252 
delivered to children 9 months to 5 years old in December 2020 with 95% coverage would reduce the 253 
risk of an outbreak to 0% (0-17), 0% (0-20) and 0% (0-22) respectively in age-adjusted analysis. A 254 
similar SIA would reduce the risk of an outbreak to 0% in all the scenarios assuming a 50% reduction 255 
in contacts in December 2020 (Figure 4) 256 
 257 
Even if RI coverage is low through to December 2021, the risk for a large measles outbreak would be 258 
mitigated through an SIA for under-fives if delivered as soon as possible (Additional file 5: Fig. S1) 259 
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Impact of delayed vaccination on outbreak probability 260 
A 3-month and 6-month delay in the receipt of MCV1 in age-eligible children caused a marginal 261 
increase in the risk of a large measles outbreak (Additional file 6: Fig. S1). This increase in outbreak 262 
risk associated with delay in receipt of MCV1 was also evident for different assumptions of transmission 263 
reduction during lockdown (Additional file 6: Fig. S1) 264 
Crude Population immunity 265 
The predicted crude population immunity was slightly higher compared to age-adjusted immunity but 266 
followed the same declining trend over time (Additional file 7: Fig. S1). Before contact restrictions 267 
came into place, 73% of simulations were below the HIT and by October 2020 and July 2020, this 268 
immunity fell below the HIT in more than 95% of simulations under scenario C and D respectively 269 
(Additional file 8: Fig. S1). 270 
 271 
  272 
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Discussion  273 
 274 
Our analysis suggests a decline in population immunity during COVID-19 pandemic will result in an 275 
increased risk of a measles outbreak depending on the extent to which routine vaccination coverage is 276 
reduced. We estimated the probability of a large measles outbreak from the introduction of a single 277 
infectious individual to be 38% (19-54), 46% (30-59), 54% (43-64) in December 2020 assuming a 15%, 278 
50% or 100% reduction in routine measles vaccination coverage respectively since April 2020. This 279 
risk, which will increase to 43% (25-56), 54% (43-63) and 67% (59-72) by December 2021 will be 280 
greatly reduced if a SIA among children <5 years old is conducted before or immediately after all 281 
COVID-19 related restrictions on physical contact are lifted. 282 
 283 
We based our analysis on an immunity model that combined serological data and age-specific mixing 284 
patterns in Kenya. Combining the two is a better strategy for predicting outbreaks as opposed to using 285 
immunity profiles alone as it allows adjustment of overall immunity by taking into account 286 
contribution of each age-group to transmission.17  287 
 288 
As there is considerable uncertainty in actual reduction of routine vaccination uptake, we predicted 289 
population immunity for scenarios of routine vaccination coverage since April 2020 i.e., 15%, 50% and 290 
100% reductions, and the corresponding outbreak risk. Our assumption of 15% reduction in vaccine 291 
coverage rates is based on reduction in vaccine clinic visits in Kilifi County (DHIS2 Routine Report) 292 
while the 50% reduction lies in the range of reported disruption in vaccination services from WHO 293 
immunisation pulse poll.6 We assumed a 50% reduction in measles transmissibility given that COVID-294 
19 mitigation measures implemented on 25th March 2020 were reported to have reduced social 295 
contacts and disease transmission by the same margin.24 Although some restriction measures remain in 296 
place e.g. nationwide curfew, others like the partial lockdown have since been eased and ban on 297 
international flights was lifted on 1st August 2020. While the assumption of a 50% reduction in measles 298 
transmission was applicable at the beginning of the epidemic due to stringent measures imposed, 299 
current herd immunity threshold may be much higher than originally assumed but still lower than 300 
pre-COVID-19 threshold.  301 
15 
To accoun for the  uncertainty in measles transmissibility during lockdown, we explored two other 302 
scenarios,  25% and 75%   reduction in measles transmission in a sensitivity analysis. We found that a 303 
75% reduction in measles transmission would result to zero outbreaks in all the scenarios during the 304 
entire study period, which was much lower compared to the outbreak probability in our baseline 305 
analysis. A 25% reduction in measles transmission resulted to a much higher probability of measles 306 
outbreak compared to our baseline analysis. For instance, in December 2020, the estimated outbreak 307 
risk was 28% (7-45) compared to 0% (0-18) in our baseline analysis assuming a 50% reduction in routine 308 
vaccination coverage. 309 
 310 
In the calculation of a quantitative impact of outbreak risk, our estimate of the probability of a large 311 
outbreak was based on the introduction of a single infectious individual in a population where there is 312 
hardly any measles circulation. Based on our results, the outbreak probability would be much higher 313 
and severe if multiple cases were introduced. 314 
 315 
SIAs in Kenya are generally conducted every 2-4 years and provide a second opportunity for 316 
vaccination in children regardless of their vaccination history and are ideally timed to close immunity 317 
gaps arising from accumulation of susceptible and vaccine failures.25 They have been shown to be 318 
effective in increasing immunisation equity by reaching children from poor households.26 In February 319 
2020, at the time of the planned national SIA, we estimated that 90% (85-92) of the population were 320 
immune after adjusting for age-differences in social contact. This immunity which was equivalent to a 321 
34% (8-54) probability of a large outbreak suggests the SIA would have been timely in closing immunity 322 
gaps. The risk of an outbreak which was accelerated by immunity gaps arising in children who missed 323 
their routinely delivered MCV1 and MCV2 continued to increase in subsequent months following the 324 
start of COVID-19 and by December 2020, the estimated risk had increased to 38% (19-54), 46% (30-325 
59), 54% (43-64) assuming a 15%, 50% and 100% reduction in measles vaccination coverage 326 
respectively. Based on limited information on additional reductions in vaccination coverage as the 327 
pandemic progressed in Kenya’s devolved counties and marked reduction in vaccination services in 328 
Kenya in May 2020 compared to January and February 2020 reported in the second WHO 329 
immunisation poll, it is highly probable most areas will experience an outbreak risk of 46% (30-59) 330 
corresponding to a 50% reduction in routine coverage. 331 
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 332 
Assuming all COVID-19 restrictions remain in place, the risk of outbreaks would only be experienced 333 
in the suspended RI scenario in 2021. The severity and timing of these outbreaks would be largely 334 
reduced if a measles vaccine campaign is delivered but it will also depend on time delay of catch-up 335 
campaigns and speed at which a campaign can be organised. In December 2020 for instance, a SIA 336 
would reduce outbreak risk to zero in all scenarios with an upper bound risk of 15% while in December 337 
2021, outbreak risk would reduce to zero with an upper bound risk of 25% after delivery of SIA. 338 
 339 
The current disruption to vaccination services will cause further delays to vaccination, which is a 340 
challenge even in normal circumstances. We had previously reported consistently poor timeliness of 341 
MCV1 vaccination across 6 different birth-cohorts (2011-2016) in Kenya.20 Here, a delay in age of 342 
MCV1 by 3 months resulted in a marginal increase in outbreak risk. For instance, assuming a 50% 343 
reduction in routine vaccination, a delay in vaccination would see the risk increase from 46% (30-59) 344 
to 53% (40-64) by the end of the year. This reiterates the importance of timeliness in administration of 345 
vaccines in children as even a slight delay may cause considerable immunity gaps. 346 
 347 
Our results emphasize the importance of maintaining high RI coverage during this pandemic because 348 
the benefits of sustaining RI services far outweighs the risks of any excess COVID-19 deaths that may 349 
arise from vaccination clinic visits.27 Due to the highly infectious nature of measles, massive outbreaks 350 
following disruptions to health care systems and reduced MCV1 coverage are typical. Following the 351 
West Africa Ebola outbreak in 2014-2015, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea reported more than a 25% 352 
reductions in MCV1 coverage.28,29 Reported cases also occurred in a lower age group compared to pre-353 
Ebola period suggesting accumulation of susceptible children who missed their vaccine doses was a key 354 
contributor. Immunity gaps continued to be felt in these countries two years later even after successful 355 
implementation of SIAs. 356 
 357 
Recently, measles outbreaks have been reported in five counties in Kenya30 even with COVID-19 358 
restrictions which suggests an adverse synergistic interaction between pre-existing gaps of 359 
susceptibility due to lower vaccination coverage in some counties (compared to national estimates) and 360 
a precipitous drop in RI coverage during this period. These outbreaks and our results are well aligned 361 
17 
with recent Kenya measles risk assessment report by the Measles and Rubella Initiative, and recent 362 
WHO guidance on catch-up vaccination to close the immunity gaps caused by the COVID-19 363 
pandemic. 364 
 365 
As expected, majority of vaccine eligible children had protective antibody concentrations against 366 
measles while only one of 20 (0.05%) infants under 9 months old had protective levels. This suggests 367 
that there is an extended period of susceptibility in young infants probably a consequence of rapid 368 
decay of maternally acquired antibody. This will require further investigation in Kenya. However, this 369 
phenomenon has been previously reported in areas where maternal immunity is increasingly from 370 
immunisation rather than natural infection.31  371 
 372 
Our analysis was based on data from a rural area in African region. Although these results are largely 373 
representative of rural areas in measles endemic settings, they may vary in an urban setting especially 374 
as measles susceptibility profiles have been shown to vary across urban and rural settings mainly due 375 
to heterogeneity in vaccination coverage and the different mixing patterns between and within age-376 
groups.  377 
 378 
A key strength of our study is availability of recent serological data which provides an excellent means 379 
of directly estimating levels of population protection against infection and can also be used to guide 380 
post-COVID-19 SIAs. In addition, availability of an age-mixing matrix from the same area allowed us 381 
to estimate overall immunity by taking into account the level of contact between different age-groups.  382 
 383 
Our study has a few limitations. Population immunity was only available for children <15 years but we 384 
varied observed immunity estimates in adults from a previous study in our model which resulted in a 385 
slight shift in overall immunity. Our results showing SIAs conducted in under-fives will mitigate the 386 
risk of measles outbreak risk are based on the assumption that  majority (96%) of the older age groups 387 
have measles immunity. Susceptibility gaps in this older age-groups will require SIAs for a wider age 388 
range (e.g., 9 months to 15 years) to close population immunity gaps and reduce the outbreak risk. The 389 
serological data estimates and the mixing matrix used in our study may not be fully representative of 390 
the country although we utilised national estimates of vaccination coverage, which was the main driver 391 
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of predicted immunity. We did not explicitly model MCV2 delivery but assumed the overall 392 
effectiveness was an average of MCV1 and MCV2 efficacy weighted by proportion of children who 393 
either receive MCV1 only or both doses. Finally, there is some uncertainty around the actual reduction 394 
in transmission due to variability in compliance with physical distancing measures in place. However, 395 
we accounted for uncertainty by varying both the reduction in transmission and the R0. 396 
Conclusions 397 
Measles SIA originally scheduled for February 2020 in Kenya would have been well-timed as 398 
population immunity was below herd immunity threshold. Interruptions to RI since the start of 399 
COVID-19 pandemic restrictions in Kenya have now widened the measles immunity gap, but 400 
associated risk of large measles outbreaks were partially mitigated by COVID-19 contact restrictions in 401 
place. As these measures have almost been fully lifted, we estimate that measles outbreak risks will 402 
dramatically increase, and an immediate SIA will be required to close measles immunity gaps.  403 
 404 




1. Why Kenyans are begging their president for freedom. BBC News. 2020. 408 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52977771 (accessed June 11,2020. 409 
2. COVID-19 Dampens Kenya’s Economic Outlook as Government Scales up Safety Net Measures. 410 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/04/29/covid-19-dampens-kenyas-economic-411 
outlook-as-government-scales-up-safety-net-measures. 412 
3. Brand SPC, Aziza R, Kombe IK, et al. Forecasting the scale of the COVID-19 epidemic in Kenya. 413 
medRxiv 2020: 2020.04.09.20059865. 414 
4. Nelson R. COVID-19 disrupts vaccine delivery. Lancet Infect Dis 2020; 20(5): 546. 415 
5. Abbas K, Procter SR, van Zandvoort K, et al. Routine childhood immunisation during the COVID-416 
19 pandemic in Africa: a benefit-risk analysis of health benefits versus excess risk of SARS-CoV-2 417 
infection. Lancet Glob Health 2020. 418 
6. WHO. Special feature: immunization and COVID-19. 419 
http://www.who.int/immunization/monitoring_surveillance/immunization-and-covid-19/en/. 420 
7. WHO. Guiding principles for immunization activities during the COVID-19 pandemic: interim 421 
guidance, 26 March 2020: World Health Organization, 2020. 422 
8. RobertsApr. Polio, measles, other diseases set to surge as COVID-19 forces suspension of 423 
vaccination campaigns. 2020. https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/04/polio-measles-other-424 
diseases-set-surge-covid-19-forces-suspension-vaccination-campaigns. 425 
9. Kisangau N, Sergon K, Ibrahim Y, et al. Progress towards elimination of measles in Kenya, 2003-426 
2016. Pan Afr Med J 2018; 31: 65-. 427 
10. Scott JAG, Bauni E, Moisi JC, et al. Profile: the Kilifi health and demographic surveillance system 428 
(KHDSS). International journal of epidemiology 2012; 41(3): 650-7. 429 
11. PCVIS|Kemri|Wellcome Trust. https://kemri-wellcome.org/programme/pcvis-2/. 430 
12. Smits GP, van Gageldonk PG, Schouls LM, van der Klis FR, Berbers GA. Development of a bead-431 
based multiplex immunoassay for simultaneous quantitative detection of IgG serum antibodies against 432 
measles, mumps, rubella, and varicella-zoster virus. Clinical and Vaccine Immunology 2012; 19(3): 396-433 
400. 434 
13. Merkel M, Ben-Youssef L, Newman LP, et al. Seroprevalence of measles IgG among HIV-1-435 
infected and uninfected Kenyan adults. International Journal of Infectious Diseases 2014; 19: 103-5. 436 
14. WHO | Data sag. https://www.who.int/immunization/monitoring_surveillance/data/en/. 437 
15. Subaiya S, Tabu C, N’ganga J, et al. Use of the revised World Health Organization cluster survey 438 
methodology to classify measles-rubella vaccination campaign coverage in 47 counties in Kenya, 2016. 439 
PloS one 2018; 13(7): e0199786. 440 
16. Kiti MC, Kinyanjui TM, Koech DC, Munywoki PK, Medley GF, Nokes DJ. Quantifying age-related 441 
rates of social contact using diaries in a rural coastal population of Kenya. PloS one 2014; 9(8): e104786. 442 
17. Funk S, Knapp JK, Lebo E, et al. Combining serological and contact data to derive target 443 
immunity levels for achieving and maintaining measles elimination. BMC medicine 2019; 17(1): 180. 444 
18. Guerra FM, Bolotin S, Lim G, et al. The basic reproduction number (R0) of measles: a systematic 445 
review. The Lancet Infectious Diseases 2017; 17(12): e420-e8. 446 
19. Quaife M, van Zandvoort K, Gimma A, et al. The impact of COVID-19 control measures on social 447 
contacts and transmission in Kenyan informal settlements. BMC Med 2020; 18(1): 316. 448 
20. Adetifa IM, Karia B, Mutuku A, et al. Coverage and timeliness of vaccination and the validity of 449 
routine estimates: Insights from a vaccine registry in Kenya. Vaccine 2018; 36(52): 7965-74. 450 
21. Cines C. National policy guidelines on immunization 2013. Nairobi: Ministry of Health 2014. 451 
20 
22. Lochlainn LMN, de Gier B, van der Maas N, et al. Immunogenicity, effectiveness, and safety of 452 
measles vaccination in infants younger than 9 months: a systematic review and meta-analysis. The 453 
Lancet Infectious Diseases 2019; 19(11): 1235-45. 454 
23. Sudfeld CR, Navar AM, Halsey NA. Effectiveness of measles vaccination and vitamin A treatment. 455 
International journal of epidemiology 2010; 39(suppl_1): i48-i55. 456 
24. Quaife M, van Zandvoort K, Gimma A, et al. The impact of COVID-19 control measures on social 457 
contacts and transmission in Kenyan informal settlements. medRxiv 2020. 458 
25. Khetsuriani N, Deshevoi S, Goel A, Spika J, Martin R, Emiroglu N. Supplementary immunization 459 
activities to achieve measles elimination: experience of the European Region. The Journal of infectious 460 
diseases 2011; 204(suppl_1): S343-S52. 461 
26. Portnoy A, Jit M, Helleringer S, Verguet S. Impact of measles supplementary immunization 462 
activities on reaching children missed by routine programs. Vaccine 2018; 36(1): 170-8. 463 
27. Abbas K, Procter SR, van Zandvoort K, et al. Routine childhood immunisation during the COVID-464 
19 pandemic in Africa: a benefit–risk analysis of health benefits versus excess risk of SARS-CoV-2 465 
infection. The Lancet Global Health 2020. 466 
28. Takahashi S, Metcalf CJE, Ferrari MJ, et al. Reduced vaccination and the risk of measles and 467 
other childhood infections post-Ebola. Science 2015; 347(6227): 1240-2. 468 
29. Shrivastava SR, Shrivastava PS, Jegadeesh R. Legacy of Ebola outbreak: Potential risk of measles 469 
outbreak in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. Journal of research in medical sciences: the official journal 470 
of Isfahan University of Medical Sciences 2015; 20(5): 529. 471 
30. Epi Week 26 Disease Outbreak SITREP. https://www.health.go.ke/wp-472 
content/uploads/2020/07/Epi-Week-26-Disease-Outbreak-SITREP.pdf. 473 
31. Guerra FM, Crowcroft NS, Friedman L, et al. Waning of measles maternal antibody in infants in 474 
measles elimination settings–a systematic literature review. Vaccine 2018; 36(10): 1248-55. 475 
32. Rcore. R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing; R Foundation for Statistical 476 

























Figure 1. Age-stratified population immunity profile. Estimated age-stratified proportion of the Kilifi 501 
County population who were immune to measles infection in August 2019 from data. Antibody 502 
concentrations ≥0∙12 IU/ml were defined as protective. Confidence bounds displayed (in red) are the 503 
95% quantiles of a nonparametric bootstrap that is used to propagate uncertainty into the modelling 504 
framework. MCV1 is recommended to be administered at 9 months as per the Kenyan immunisation 505 
schedule and MCV2 from 18 months 506 
 507 
Figure 2. Monthly projected age adjusted immunity profiles from September 2019 to December 2021. 508 
The changes in coverage took effect in April 2020. The black dotted line shows the herd immunity 509 
threshold for measles before the COVID-19 physical distancing measures, 0∙93 (0∙92 to 0∙94) and the 510 
brown dotted line shows the herd immunity threshold during COVID-19 physical distancing measures, 511 
0∙86[0∙83-0∙89], assuming the lockdown measures are still in effect. The bold lines and shaded region in 512 
each scenario i.e. A. No reduction, B. 15% reduction, C. 50% reduction and D. 100% reduction indicate 513 
the median estimates and the uncertainty of the predicted immunity quantified as the 95% quantiles 514 
of the bootstrap analysis. There was a quick decline of predicted immunity over the study period that 515 
was based on assumed reduction in routine coverage 516 
 517 
Figure 3. Probability of a large measles outbreak sparked by a single infected individual. Outbreak 518 
probability was calculated using the predicted immunity and herd immunity threshold before (red) 519 
and during (green) COVID-19 movement restriction measures. Zero probability indicates no 520 
possibility of an outbreak. The bold lines and shaded region in each scenario i.e. A. No reduction, B. 521 
15% reduction, C. 50% reduction and D. 100% reduction indicate the median estimates of outbreak 522 
risk and the uncertainty quantified as the 95% quantiles of the bootstrap analysis. The risk of a large 523 
measles outbreak from the introduction of a single infectious individual increased quickly based on 524 
the level of impairment of routine vaccination coverage 525 
 526 
 527 
Figure 4. Probability of a single infectious person seeding a large outbreak before (none) and after 528 
implementing a SIA in children 9 months to 5 years old (U5) and in 9 months to 15 years old (U15) at 529 
different timepoints post-lockdown (Normal transmission) and during lockdown (50% transmission 530 
reduction). Outbreak probability was calculated by comparing the proportion immune with the herd 531 
immunity threshold. The shaded area is the median estimate of the outbreak risk and the error bars 532 
indicate the uncertainty in outbreak risk quantified as the 95% quantiles of the bootstrap analysis. In 533 
all the scenarios, i.e. A. No reduction, B. 15% reduction, C. 50% reduction and D. 100% reduction, the 534 
risk of a large measles outbreak would be largely mitigated through delivery of a SIA among children 535 
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 761 
Additional file 1 762 
 763 
Table S1. Serological data used in the analysis. The table shows counts of all tested 764 
individuals and positive individuals in the different age-categories 765 
Age-categories All samples Positive samples 
<9m 20 1 
9m-<1yr 18 9 
1yr 48 45 
2yrs 47 42 
3yrs 53 49 
4-8yrs 237 228 
9-14yrs 74 71 
Total 497 445 




































Figure S1. Age stratified population immunity profiles. The three HITs are based on the three 801 
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 857 
 858 
Figure S1. Probability of a large outbreak sparked by a single infectious individual assuming different 859 































Figure S1. Probability of a single infectious person seeding a large outbreak before (none) and after 890 
implementing a SIA in children 9 months to 5 years old (U5) and in 9 months to 15 years old (U15) at 891 


















Additional file 6 909 
 910 
 911 
Figure S1. Impact of delayed vaccination on outbreak probability after lifting of contact 912 
reducing measures (Normal transmission) and assuming different levels of reduction in 913 














Additional file 7 927 
 928 
 929 
Figure S1. Monthly projected unadjusted and contact adjusted immunity profiles from September 930 
2019 to December 2021. The changes in coverage took effect in April 2020∙ The black line shows the 931 
herd immunity threshold for measles before the COVID-19 pandemic 0∙93 (0∙92 to 0∙94) and the 932 
brown line shows the herd immunity threshold during COVID-19 pandemic of 50%, 0∙86 [0∙83-0∙89], 933 
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 952 
Figure S1. Percentage of simulations with proportion immune > herd immunity threshold for crude 953 
population immunity 954 
